States have gradually shifted to high-frequency match-runs, raising the question of whether this harms the number of transplants. We conducted simulations using clinical data from 2 KPD registries-the Alliance for Paired Donation, which runs multihospital exchanges, and Methodist San Antonio, which runs single-center exchanges-to study how the frequency of match-runs impacts the number of transplants and the average waiting times. We simulate the options facing each of the 2 registries by repeated resampling from their historical pools of patient-donor pairs and nondirected donors, with arrival and departure rates corresponding to the historical data. We find that longer intervals between match-runs do not increase the total number of transplants, and that prioritizing highly sensitized patients is more effective than waiting longer between match-runs for transplanting highly sensitized patients. While we do not find that frequent match-runs result in fewer transplanted pairs, we do find that increasing arrival rates of new pairs improves both the fraction of transplanted pairs and waiting times.
While the timing for deceased organ allocation is determined by the availability of organs, the timing of match-runs in KPD is more flexible. Longer intervals between match-runs allow for the accumulation of more pairs in the pool and may allow more potential matches. However, we will see that there is an important difference between pool size and composition. A larger pool of patient-donor pairs who have not previously failed to match provides many more matches than an equally large pool that includes many pairs for whom no matches were accomplished in previous match-runs, and this will reduce the benefits of delaying match-runs in mature pools that contain many hard-to-match pairs. Furthermore, infrequent match-runs may also slow down the complex process of identifying matches and carrying out transplants. This problem is amplified by the large fraction of proposed virtual matches that fail because of immunological, logistical, and other reasons. 11, 13 Furthermore, additional time on the waiting list is undesirable for candidates.
14 National KPD programs in the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Australia, and Canada conduct infrequent match-runs. In the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Australia, a match-run is conducted every 3 months and in Canada every 4 months. [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] In the United
States, KPD programs typically match very frequently: multicenter programs such as the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD) and National Kidney Registry match daily, United Network for Organ Sharing finds matches weekly, and also single-center programs such as Methodist at San Antonio (MSA) search for matches whenever a new pair becomes available. In the United States, competition among KPD programs to produce transplants may have incentivized programs to perform match-runs at high frequency, which raises a major concern that such frequent matching may lead to fewer transplants. 13 In particular, matching frequently may lead to inefficient use of easy-to-match donors and missed opportunities for the most sensitized candidates.
This article studies the impact of matching frequencies on the number of potential transplants and on the average waiting time to transplant in a pool of candidate-donor pairs. While matching frequency may affect outcomes by changing the pool size, other factors that determine pool size include acquisition rate and departure rate.
This article further explores how these factors impact the fraction of the pool transplanted. We use the set of enrolled pairs from both the APD over a 9-year period and the MSA over a 3.5-year period.
The MSA and APD provide us with 2 distinct, nonoverlapping datasets with very different pools of participating pairs (eg, number of: blood type O donors, easy-to-match pairs, NDDs, and compatible pairs) and different operational practices that significantly impact the connectivity of the respective pools. These different datasets allow us to evaluate the effects of match-run frequency in very different environments, thus providing a robustness check for the policies studied.
| METHODS

| Data
The APD data consist of the characteristics of all incompatible pairs, Table 1 (for patients with multiple donors we select 1 donor randomly for this distribution) and Pool panel reactive antibodies (PRA) distribution in Table 2 .
The compatibility between a patient and a donor is determined by their blood types and a virtual crossmatch test, which compares the patient's antibodies (as entered by the patient's transplant center) and the donor's human leukocyte antigen. In addition to the virtual crossmatch, transplant centers perform a crossmatch to verify compatibility. Finally, proposed offers fail to culminate in transplants for a variety of reasons that we model with failure rates described below. The 2 main types of failures occur due to positive crossmatch and rejection of the proposed donor by the recipient's center.
13
| APD versus MSA data composition
This study does not allow us to compare the efficiency of the APD and MSA. Part of the value of these 2 datasets is the real differences in the connectivity of the pools' compatibility graphs between APD and MSA (ie, to the extent to which pairs are likely to be able to exchange with others in the pool). For example, the MSA dataset does not have to take into account discretionary exclusion criteria by different transplant centers as is done in the APD, which lowers the connectivity of the APD pool. MSA further allows higher mean fluorescence intensity (MFI) cutoffs than APD centers allow, which translates to more compatibilities between donors and patients and hence a more connected compatibility graph (ie, more possibilities of donation from 1 pair to another). In addition, the MSA dataset has more compatible pairs participating compared to APD and no "selection" in that all pairs participate in the MSA system, whereas the APD loses easy-to-match and compatible pairs due to internal matching outside the APD. MSA also has a higher percentage of pairs with multiple donors than APD, again increasing possibilities of donation from 1 pair to another.
Because of the substantial differences between the 2 pools, the computational experiments we conduct on each pool will be informative by providing "within-experiment" comparisons of different match 
| Optimization
For each match-run, we execute the matching algorithm on the available pool of incompatible pairs and NDDs to find a maximum "weighted" solution. One type of sensitivity analysis we conduct is to vary the priorities assigned to different patients based on their level of sensitization. We tested 3 strategies (S1, S2, S3) that use different weights assigned to a given patient's transplant based on the patient's calculated PRA (cPRA) ( 
| Simulation design
For each set of parameters, we run Monte Carlo simulations for 50
iterations. In each iteration we simulate the arrival of 5000 pairs and a small fraction of NDDs. The goal is to analyze the steady state that is reached by having a departure rate as described below. Each time period (number of days) we sample from the data pairs and NDDs with replacement according to some fixed arrival rate. In the base case, a pair or an NDD joins the pool every 2 days. We also simulate the departure of pairs and NDDs from the pool without being matched as observed in the data.
For the APD, we set the number of NDDs that join the pool (during the arrival of 5000 pairs) to 160. The base case departure rate for the APD data is estimated using a Cox model, and on average a pair or NDD remains in the pool for 420 days (this rate varies only slightly across different types of pairs). In particular, each pair or NDD leaves the pool with probability 1/420 per day independently for reasons other than a match within the pool. We further conduct sensitivity analysis both on arrival rates and departure rates. For the MSA data we do not have good estimates and set the base case average stay in the pool to 800 days. This was chosen to be larger than the estimated departure rate of the APD because pairs at the MSA do not enroll in competing exchange programs (but here too we conduct a sensitivity analysis). Due to the very small number of NDDs in the MSA data, we restrict attention only to pairs and thus assume there are no chains when using MSA data (however, we also conducted simulations with chains and found similar qualitative results).
While the simulation is run until all pairs have arrived, statistics are measured only for pairs that arrived after the 100 th pair arrived to decrease the biases at the ``beginning" of the simulation and capture steady-state results. Simulations were run for different matching frequencies.
We model the failure rate of match offers being converted to transplants. In APD, after the matching algorithm identifies a match, each candidate's center has up to 1 day to accept the offer or not. All the simulations using MSA data assume the no-delay model, as MSA is a single-center program that can reoptimize immediately after some failure occurred. In fact, most simulations are conducted T A B L E 3 Base weights assigned by strategies 1 through 3 (S1-S3). Strategies S1, S2, S3 set the weight only according to the recipient's cPRA cPRA S1 S2 S3 under the no-delay model in order to evaluate the impact of policies on transplants in "best-case" scenarios.
| RESULTS
The measured simulation outcomes are the fraction of patient-donor pairs transplanted and the average waiting time to transplants experienced by the candidates over the entire study. Simulations were run with the intervals between match-runs of 2, 4, 7, 14, 30, 60, and 120 days.
| Impact of match-run frequency under different prioritization strategies
We first test the effect of varying the interval between match-runs under different prioritization strategies. between the MSA and APD (for instance, 11% difference in the fraction of matched pairs, Figures 2 and 3 , under the no-delay model). This difference in the fraction of matched pairs is due to differences in the connectivity of the pools. Note that in Table 1 is not expected to be helpful under the delay model). For simplicity we also present the next results only for strategy S2 as we find no qualitative differences between the 3 strategies in the simulations. For clarity we present the next results only under strategy S2 as we find no qualitative differences in the simulations.
| Varying arrival and/or departure rates
We conduct sensitivity analysis on the arrival rate of new pairs (base case is 1 arrival every 2 days = 1 period) and report in Figure 4 simulation results under the no-delay model when a pair arrives every t periods (t = 1, 2, 4, 7, 14). For each arrival rate, the fraction of transplanted pairs does not increase as the interval between matchruns increases. However, the greater the arrival rate, the greater the fraction of transplanted pairs and the lower the waiting time (note: the larger the t, the lower the arrival rate). The bottom plots provide a different view of the results. Note that the arrival rate is a major factor determining the fraction of transplanted patients, whereas the matching frequency plots essentially coincide (except the lowest frequencies). The lower the arrival rate the more benefit there is to increase arriving pairs. This benefit is minor for very high arrival rates (after 350-700 pairs annually).
We also varied the average time a pair remains in the pool in MSA and APD (x = 420, 800, 1000). The results ( Figure 5) show that as the departure rate becomes large (1/x), the smaller the fraction of pairs that are transplanted. However, for every departure rate, matching frequently does not harm the fraction of matched pairs. Like the
F I G U R E 2
Statistics under the nodelay model using APD data. The x-axis represents the time interval between 2 match-runs. Strategies S1-S3 are defined in the "strategies" section and Table 3 . 
F I G U R E 3
Statistics under the nodelay model using MSA data. The x-axis represents the time interval between 2 match-runs. Strategies S1-S3 are defined in the "strategies" section and Table 3 . impact of arrival rate, decreasing departure rate increases the fraction of transplanted patients.
| Varying practical constraints: NDDs and cycle length
We ran similar simulations to explore different constraints.
Simulations assuming no NDDs in the APD result in similar patterns 
| Match efficiency
One indicator of the matching efficiency of a KPD program is the fraction of blood type O donor kidneys that are transplanted into blood type O patients (intuitively, in a very large pool all blood type O donor kidneys would be transplanted into blood type O patients). Figure 7 shows that using longer match-run intervals does not increase this measure under different prioritization strategies and different arrival rates. However, increasing the arrival rate results in a higher blood type O match efficiency.
| DISCUSSION
As KPD has become more widely used, the databases of patients and donors have grown rapidly and they contain a large fraction of highly sensitized patients. 21 It is therefore important to evaluate the effect of increasing the pool size in order to create more opportunities for these patients. To do so we vary the match-run frequencies (which can be determined by the KPD program) but also vary the exogenous arrival rate (which is a consequence of participation and collaboration).
Using the accumulated patient/donor pool at the APD and MSA databases, we modeled running a matching algorithm, making match offers, accounting for rejected offers, and simulated laboratory crossmatches. We varied the match-run frequency, the arrival rate to the pool, and the departure rate from the pool. Sensitivity analyses were performed for pool connectivity, priorities assigned to highly sensitized patients, failure rates, use of NDDs, and chain/cycle length. We find that matching frequently does not reduce the fraction of the pool matched. Importantly, however, the fraction of the pool transplanted does increase as either the arrival rate increases or the departure rate decreases. In fact, increasing arrival rate is the most important modifiable factor to increase the fraction of the pool transplanted, particularly for low arrival rates. While the exact numbers might differ across datasets, the general principles will still hold.
These results help illustrate why the size of the pool is not by itself a good indicator of the fraction of patients who can be transplanted. A large arrival rate means a large pool with many matchable pairs, while a low fraction of transplantable patients can also produce a large pool, but of hard-to-match pairs.
The lesson for the United States is that KPD programs should consider efforts to collaborate to increase their arrival rate. While waiting 1-2 weeks between match-runs does not reduce the fraction of pool transplanted, using this time to clarify competing matches for easy-tomatch pairs by using different strategies may help to achieve predetermined goals such as more transplants for hard-to-match patients. For non-US KPD programs that perform match-runs less frequently than every month and have nonnegligible departure rates, it may worth experimenting with more frequent match-runs. Finally, non-US programs with a low acquisition rate and low match rate may benefit from international collaboration to increase their acquisition rate. This is likely to have a much larger impact on the fraction of the pool they match than does match frequency. The logistics of international exchange currently serve as a barrier to broader collaboration, and strategies to overcome these barriers should become an active area of research.
Intuitively, matching frequently does not harm the fraction of Put differently, when the departure rate is low, many hard-to-match pairs accumulate in the pool and so waiting with a newly arriving easyto-match pair is unnecessary since it is likely to match to one of the already present hard-to-match pairs. And when the departure rate is high, matching infrequently will result in many departures of easy-tomatch pairs.
Moreover, that a low arrival rate yields a match rate below the maximum is a result of both departures of unmatched pairs and suboptimal matching, which would not have happened in a thicker pool. KPD programs vary in the priorities they use. Our findings suggest that while prioritization of highly sensitized patients increases the percentage of these patients transplanted, it does not significantly increase the total number of transplants. However, guidelines for how to prioritize pairs can come from studying unmatched departures.
Some strategies used by MSA affect matching frequency and are driven by other factors. Donors may have strong preferences over when to donate, so it is important to prioritize donors whose window for donation closes soon. Moreover, compatible pairs should be given high priority, otherwise they may choose to depart to conduct a direct transplant. These strategies are consistent with matching frequently.
This study has limitations. Only a limited number of strategies are considered and some other strategies may perform better. Strategies that consider the future may have benefits over strategies that optimize in the current pool. 23, 24 However, this is unlikely when the arrival rate is high, since it will be possible to match easy-to-match pairs upon arrival to hard-to-match pairs due to the accumulation of the latter. Also, while patient data are taken from actual KPD registries, we made simplifying assumptions that may weaken our conclusions. We assumed failure rates are independent, and assumed a steady influx of pairs into the database. However, we emphasize that while we report only a representative set of simulations, we found similar qualitative findings under a much broader set of strategies and with lower failure rates. Also, while frequent and infrequent match-runs result in a similar fraction of matched pairs, matching infrequently may allow an increase in match quality. Additionally, departure rates in our simulations are identical for all pairs. If frequent matching for a given KPD program is a good strategy with identical departure rates, it would remain a good strategy also when easier-to-match pairs depart faster than harder-tomatch pairs since these pairs match quickly in our simulations. Finally, some departures are due to transplants, which are good outcomes.
Thus, the reasons for departures from a KPD pool should be studied.
We also do not explicitly study competition between KPD programs. However, we predict the following effects: When patients do not cross-register, the existence of multiple programs reduces the arrival rate of each; when some patients cross-register, departure rates may be influenced by match rates at competing programs. So matching frequency, by affecting the match rate, affects departures and arrivals at competing programs, and the overall chance of a pair to match should be further studied.
In summary, while we do not find that frequent match-runs result in fewer transplants, we do find that increasing arrival rates and decreasing departure rates improves both the fraction of matched pairs and waiting times. So while the fraction of matched patients (and their waiting times) may be harmed by competition among KPD programs, it is unlikely due to the high frequency of match-runs, but rather due to low arrival rates of pairs and high departure rates.
